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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- PUBLIC TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES -
The criminal trial has been traditionally open to the public in Anglo-
Saxon procedure, 1 as it was in Roman and other civilized societies of 
an earlier time.2 The public trial of today, however, has been subjected 
to considerable criticism on the ground that there is a tendency for 
criminal trials to degenerate into public spectacles, frequently inter-
rupting the orderly procedure of justice, and not infrequently actually 
prejudicing the accused. 3 If no useful purpose is served by the pres-
20 Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L.Q. 205 at 239 (1930). 
21 2 JoNES, MORTGAGES 572 (1928). 
22Bartels v. Seefus, 132 Neb. 841, 273 N.W. 485 (1937); Snow v. Arnold, 132 Fla. 
435, 181 s. 7 (1938). 
23 Other cases involving the self-interest justification include the discharge of tax liens 
by mortgagees, De Haven v. Roscon Building & Loan Assn., 107 Pa. Super. 459, 164 A. 
69 (1933), and cases collected in 61 A.L.R. 587 at 601 (1929) and 106 A.L.R. 1212 at 
1217 (1937); and the discharge by a wife of liens on her husband's property, Elmora & 
West End Building & Loan Assn. v. Dancy, 108 N.J. Eq. 542, 155 A. 796 (1931); Moody 
v. Isselstein, 106 Wash. 294, 179 P. 855 (1919). 
lJn re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948); Radin, "The Right to a Public 
Trial," 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932). 
2 JoLOWICZ, HISTORICAL !NrnoDUCTION TO RoMAN LAW 318-327, 407-409 (1932). 
3 Radin, "The Right to a Public Trial," 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932). 
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ence of the idle public during the deadly serious determination of guilt 
or innocence, should not the judge, subject to the right of admittance 
of any whom the accused desires in attendance, be allowed to exclude 
all who have no special interest in the proceeding?4 This comment 
will consider that question. 
I. Right of the General Public to Attend Criminal Trials 
Although historically the public trial did not seem to develop out 
of any particular solicitude for the person on trial,5 the popular con-
ception today is that the right of a public trial exists primarily for the 
benefit of the accused, and that the incidental observer attends not as 
a matter of right but as a matter of courtesy.6 Some extremists have 
gone so far as to urge that the judge, with the consent of the accused 
and the prosecutor, may arbitrarily exclude spectators from the entire 
proceedings. 7 While there certainly are cases supporting the premise 
that incidental attendance may be barred if the accused waives his 
right to a public trial,8 the same courts recognize that the people do 
have an interest in seeing that such proceedings are kept public. 0 It 
does not appear that any courts have granted requests to exclude the 
public unless such exclusion was felt necessary in the interest of jus-
tice.10 Though there is no specific constitutional safeguard protecting 
the public from arbitrary exclusion, 11 · ordinarily all who desire to 
attend a criminal trial are entitled to be admitted as long as there are 
facilities available, 12 and, despite a few indiscreet statements to the 
4 In exclusion orders it is usual practice to except persons the accused requests to have 
in attendance, and persons having a legitimate interest in the proceedings are entitled to 
remain as a matter of right. Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W. (2d) 423 
(1944). 
5 43 CAsB AND CoMMBNT No. 3, p. 8 (1937). 
6 The view seems to stem primarily from a statement by Cooley referring only to 
constitutional provisions and not considering common law custom. CooLBY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 647 (1927). It does not follow, as some have assumed, that 
there is no public interest worthy of protection. 
7 LeViness, "Crime News," 66 U.S. L. REv. 370 at 371 (1932). 
s United States v. Sorrentino, (3d Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 721. Failure to object to 
an exclusion order has been held to constitute a waiver. Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 
172 P. 273 (1918). Contra: State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906). 
9 United States v. Kohli, (3d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 919. 
10 Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 S. 504 (1938). 
11 One court has indicated that the state constitutional provision guaranteeing public 
trial is a safeguard meant to protect the public as well as the accused. State v. Keeler, 52 
Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916). 
12 Daubney v. Cooper, 5 Man. & Ry. 314, 10 B. & C. 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (1829). 
Recovery allowed in assanlt action against defendants who ejected plaintiff pursuant to 
court order. 
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contrary, most jurisdictions recognize that a judge has no authority to 
bar citizens indiscriminately from the courts.13 In a number of states 
legislative enactments require all judicial proceedings to be public, with 
the exception of certain enumerated classes of cases.14 
The basis of such a right in the public is a recognition of the fact 
that the people have an interest in knowing how the judicial system 
is functioning,15 and in seeing that the accused is given a fair and 
impartial trial and that the prosecution is accorded a proper opportu-
nity to present its case.16 Publicity in criminal proceedings constitutes 
an ever present check on the judge, stimulating his sense of responsi-
bility and curbing his prejudices.17 Furthermore, it provides a security 
for the conscientious jurist who has no reason to conceal his activity, 
thwarting attempts to discredit him by false accusations concerning his 
impartiality or competence. As continental experience has demon-
strated, judicial laxity and venality increase in the absence of critical 
scrutiny.18 Unless the necessity of excluding the public in the interest 
of a fair trial outweighs the advantages to be gained from publicity, 
the judge is not entitled to the prerogative either by his own motion 
or in concurrence with the desires of the parties. 
II. Right of the Press to Attend Criminal Trials 
In America the fourth estate is an institution of special privilege; 
it has been accorded the most solicitous treatment in the courtrooms 
of the land, securing admittance in numerous instances when the doors 
have been closed in the face of the masses.19 In general it has been 
13 Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 29 A. 943 (1893). In action against judge by 
persons excluded from a trial, recovery was denied solely on the ground that a judge is not 
answerable in damages when acting in a judicial capacity. Accord: Crisfield v. Perine, 15 
Hun. (N.Y.) 200 (1878), affd. 81 N.Y. 622 (1880). 
14 Juvenile court cases are regularly conducted in privacy. In civil litigation divorce 
cases and cases involving trade secrets are frequently heard aBsentia the public. Statutes 
are collected in 6 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1834 (1940). 
15 State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906), noted 20 HARv. L. fu:v. 
489 (1907). 
16 State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528 at 534, 88 P. (2d) 461 (1939). 
17 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JumcrAL EVIDENCE 522, 523, 568-572 (1827). 
lSEsMEIN, HISTORY oF CoNTINENTAL CmMINAL PROCEDURE 3, 145-164, 165-172, 
397, 439, 442 (1913). It was not the secret procedure that was so objectionable; it was 
the practices accompanying it. 
19 Instances in which the press has been excluded from criminal trials are exceedingly 
rare. People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (1900) (order loosely enforced). 
In determining whether the accused has been denied a public trial emphasis is frequently 
placed on the fact that the press is not excluded. People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. (2d) 72 
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recognized that the press, as the representative of the people, is entitled 
to discuss trial proceedings freely2° and can, if necessary, compel offi-
cials to make judicial records available for that purpose.21 However, 
a review of its conduct has led serious thinkers to conclude that the 
press is motivated only by a desire to increase circulation, and the ill-
effects of such a policy outweigh any possible services which might 
result from complete coverage of criminal trials.22 In support of this 
premise the picture painted is indeed black. Sensational cases are 
tried in the press before reaching the courtroom. During the trial news 
services invade the premises with such disconcerting paraphernalia as 
telegraph and recording apparatus, Hash cameras, microphones and, 
recently, television equipment.23 In this turbulent atmosphere twelve 
forgotten men try to do justice while a disgusted citizenry concludes 
that criminal trials are a farce.24 It is apparent that such situations call 
for effective sanctions, but does exclusion of the press constitute the 
proper remedy? 
Unlike British courts, which freely inflict contempt penalties on 
newssheets jeopardizing impartial determination of litigation,25 the 
American bench has seldom invoked the contempt process in similar 
at 76, 190 P. (2d) 290 (1948), noted 22 TBMP. L.Q. 232 (1948). A court may be 
entitled to exclude newsmen from a courtroom in order to prevent publication of salacious 
details. See Bloomer v. Bloomer, 197 Wis. 140, 221 N.W. 734 (1928) (divorce proceed-
ing). It is doubtful that a court can effectively enforce the order by forbidding publication 
of the testimony, at least in the absence of a statute. In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 
227 (1893). 
20 "A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property." 
Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 at 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947). 
21 Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 118 Ore. 105, 244 P. 868 (1926). In the absence 
of a statute, the right of private persons to have access to public records is more doubtful. 
22 See White, ''Newspaper and Radio Coverage of Criminal Trials: A Modern 
Dilemma," 41 J. CruM. L. 306 (1950). 
23 Televising of courtroom scenes during a murder trial has been held to be improper, 
but not reversible error. People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. (2d) 615, 226 P. (2d) 330 (1951), 
noted in 25 TBMP. L.Q. 91 (1951). Courts have acted to exclude cameras and radio 
equipment from courtrooms; there has also been legislative activity in this respect. Y esawich, 
"Televising and Broadcasting Trials," 37 CoRN. L.Q. 701 at 712-717 (1952). Taking 
a photograph in the courtroom in violation of court order has been cited in contempt. Ex 
parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927). 
24 It is argued that in sensational criminal trials in which there is a large attendance, 
counsel are likely to address their arguments to the audience and the press rather than to 
the jury. While this is a valid criticism, is it proper to treat such practice as a defect in 
the system of public trial when the real fault lies in the individuals involved and can be 
remedied in most instances by a word from the bench instead of excluding the public 
before trial begins? 
25 Goodhart, "Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law," 48 HARv. L. 
RBv. 885 (1935). 
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situations.26 It is not because our courts lack authority to punish abuses 
of the press which have the effect of preventing a fair trial.27 Hesitancy 
seems to stem primarily from the political processes by which judges 
are selected.28 Perhaps for the same reason the courts have been even 
less inclined to exclude the press from criminal proceedings.29 Although 
courtrooms occasionally have been temporarily cleared,30 there is little 
precedent for a sweeping order of exclusion barring the press through-
out the trial. 31 Since freedom of the press is not an unabridged license, 
the press, like the public, should be subject to temporary orders of 
exclusion. Furthermore, a judge should have authority to admit mem-
bers of the press conditionally, subject to prior promises not to publish 
specified matters if the judge considers them prejudicial. It has been 
suggested that such power might be unconstitutional32 as it is in the 
nature of a prior restraint on publication.33 Although permanent 
restraints of such a nature may be objectionable, there is authority for 
conditional admission of press representatives upon agreement not to 
comment on the trial until the jury has rendered a verdict.34 Perma-
nent exclusion from a trial, on the other hand, is an extreme measure 
which penalizes the responsible press for the misconduct of an irre-
sponsible minority. Such action is not necessary to secure a fair trial 
for the accused, since prejudice usually results not from a truthful 
report of the trial proceedings which the jury hears and evaluates for 
itself, but from pre-trial accounts which render it impossible to select 
impartial jurors and from statements circulated during the trial which 
are not traceable to anything stated on the witness stand. The only 
remaining reasons for excluding the press would be to protect the 
26 Nelles and King, "Contempt by Publication in the United States," 28 CoL. L. 
REv. 525-562 (1928). 
27Tate v. State ex rel. Raine, 132 Tenn. 131, 177 S.W. 69 (1915). 
28 If a publication interferes with the due administration of justice, contempt proceed-
ings ·are probably still available despite the doctrine of the Bridges case which limits the 
power of summary contempt where criticism is directed against the bench to instances 
constituting a clear and _present danger to impartial determination of litigation. Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941). The question appears to be still open if 
the publication is of a nature tending to influence the jury. Baltimore Radio Show v. 
State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A. (2d) 497 (1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252 (1950). 
29.Perry, "The Courts, the Press, and the Public," 30 MJ:cH. L. REv. 228 (1931). 
30 People v. Hall, 50 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (1900); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 
437, 86 s.w. (2d) 931 (1935). 
31 Occasionally, in the interest of a fair trial, even an accurate account of proceedings 
should not be published. 2 BxsHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §259 (1923). 
32 Comment, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840 (1950). 
33 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). 
34 United States v. Holmes, (C.C. Pa. 1842) 26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15,383. 
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judge from press retaliation for his handling of a case, a protection to 
which, apparently, he is not entitled;35 to protect innocent witnesses 
from being exploited in the press, a protection not generally accorded; 
or to protect the public itself from salacious details of sensational cases, 
a protection which a New York trial court recently deemed more 
important than the accused's right to a public trial.36 
III. Accused's Right to a Public Trial 
While the casual observer has seldom contested the authority of a 
judge to exclude him, the accused has frequently asserted that such 
exclusion is a violation of his right to a public trial, a right guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment in federal cases and also by most state con-
stitutions. 37 In some courts the phrase "public trial" has come to mean 
a trial which is not a secret trial. The constitutional right is satisfied 
if court officers, witnesses, persons otherwise connected with the pro-
ceedings and personal friends of the accused are permitted to attend.38 
This is considered sufficient to avert the abuses of earlier secret pro-
ceedings which the constitutional provisions were designed to prevent, 
and the accused is entitled to no more. Other courts construe the 
phrase to mean a trial open to the general public, recognizing, however, 
that the right of the accused to a public trial is a relative, not an abso-
lute right and may be abridged if it becomes necessary to do so in order 
to administer justice. A public trial, they premise, means something 
more than a fair trial and therefore is not to be strictly limited to classes 
of persons necessary to insure a fair trial.39 In a few courts it has also 
been suggested that the accused must demonstrate that the exclusion 
order is in fact prejudicial,40 but the majority of courts hold that denial 
of the constitutional right is prejudicial in itself.41 In support of the 
majority position it can be argued that prejudice is likely to occur 
35 See note 28 supra. 
36 N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1953, p. 1: I. Several newspapers appealed from the order 
excluding the press. Justice Schreiber of the New York Supreme Court ruled the news-
papers had no constitutional right to attend all criminal trials and report all proceedings 
therein. United Press Assns. v. Valente, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 642 (1953). On appeal to the 
appellate division the ruling was upheld (3-2 decision) .on the ground that the petitioners 
had no standing in court to protest the exclusion order. 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1953). 
37 Comment, 49 CoL. L. REv. 110 (1949). 
38 State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D. 326, 124 N.W. 71 (1909). 
39 People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995 (1891); People v. Greeson, 230 
Mich. 124, 203 N.W. 141 (1925). 
40 Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637 (1896). 
41 People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894). 
134 MICHIGAN LA.w REVIEw [ Vol. 52 
which may never be exposed.42 Possibilities of prejudice are varied. 
If the accused is innocent, it is important to him that he be exonerated 
not only in the eyes of the jury but likewise in the eyes of the commu-
nity where he is known. Loose-mouthed assertions published for all 
the world to read cast a pall of guilt on a person which lingers even 
after he is found innocent; to deny a public trial is to deny an oppor-
tunity to raise the pall.43 While courts recognize that an exclusion 
order should not reflect prejudicially on the accused or tend to discredit 
him in the eyes of the jury,44 little consideration has been given to the 
fact that in certain instances the very act of excluding the public will 
adversely influence the jury as to the enormity of the crime or unduly 
impress them as to the importance of the evidence.45 Wigmore points 
out two further benefits of publicity: (1) The presence of an audience 
will tend to prevent misstatements on the part of witnesses who have 
greater reason to believe that a falsehood will be exposed if informed 
observers are apprised of their testimony;46 and (2) publicity may 
secure useful testimony previously unknown to the accused, particu-
larly when the statements are made available to a wide audience 
through the press.47 One further argument advanced in support of a 
public trial is that the accused may be unable to prove unfair treatment 
at the hands of the court unless the proceeding is public,48 but in this 
respect the presence of his friends would assure witnesses available to 
testify in his behalf. 
Recently, in In re Oliver,49 the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a 
42 Davis v. United States, (8th Cir. 1917) 247 F. 394. 
43 See TAFT, LAW REFORM 142-148 (1926). 
44 Dutton v. State, 123-Md. 373 at 387, 91 A. 417 (1914). Examining Italians for 
weapons as they entered courtroom held not prejudicial when jury was not aware of that 
fact. People v. Mangiapane, 219 Mich. 62 at 68, 188 N.W. 401 (1922). But moving 
trial to a theater to accommodate spectators was cause for reversal as jury could infer there-
from the court felt it immaterial how accused was tried. Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 
158 N.W. 930 (1916). 
45 State v. Osborne, 54 Ore. 289, 103 P. 62 (1909). It would seem that if the public 
is ordered excluded the ju.'"}' should be instructed that the exclusion should not be construed 
as an indication of guilt on the part of the accused or of truthfulness of the witnesses 
about to testify, yet such instructions do not seem to be requested or given. Compare the 
instructions given when accused is brought into court manacled. Mahley v. State, 49 Ohio 
App. 359 at 376, 197 N.E. 339 (1934). 
46 This premise appears in the works of Blackstone and other early writers, 3 BLACKST., 
CoMM., Wendell ed., 372-373 (1854). See also 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL 
EVIDENCE 522, 523, 568-572 (1827). 
47 6 WrGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1834 (1940). 
48 Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S.E. 651 (1908). 
49 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948), noted 39 J. CnIM. L. 359 (1948). 
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public trial in state criminal proceedings. As the case was an extreme 
one involving summary contempt punishment of a witness in a secret 
one-judge grand jury inquiry, it was not necessary to define sharply 
the scope of the newly recognized right. In interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment, the lower federal courts have imposed severe restrictions 
on the discretion of the trial judge to exclude the public in federal 
criminal cases. 50 Although early cases supported broad discretionary 
exclusion power in the judges, 51 the later cases are of the view that 
except in extraordinary instances exclusion of the general public over 
the accused's objection constitutes a denial of a public trial.52 While 
it might be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the accused 
to similar treatment in state proceedings, the law has not tended to 
impart the same strict construction to the fundamental concepts con-
stituting due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as has been 
imparted to the correlative rights specifically enumerated in the first 
ten amendments. 53 The refusal of the Supreme Court on several 
occasions to review cases in which it was alleged that the accused had 
been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is perhaps 
indicative of a reluctance to interfere with local discretion in interpret-
ing the nature of a public trial so long as the determination does not 
deprive the accused of a fair trial. 54 So far the lower federal courts 
have not carried over the interpretation of "public trial" under the Sixth 
Amendment to the Fourteenth.55 
IV. Discretionary Authority of a Judge to Exclude the Public 
and Press from a Criminal Trial 
Circumstances may arise, it is universally conceded, in which it 
becomes necessary for the judge to exclude a part or all of the public 
and in such instances neither the public nor the accused has cause for 
objection. While there is general agreement recognizing authority to 
exclude in a number of situations, there is complete disagreement in 
50 Davis v. United States, (8th Cir. 1917) 247 F. 394. 
51 Reagan v. United States, (9th Cir. 1913) 202 F. 488; Callahan v. United States, 
(9th Cir. 1917) 240 F. 683. 
52 United States v. Kohli, (3d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 919, noted with approval 28 
TEX. L. Rav. 265 (1949). 
53 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 at 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942). 
54 Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E. (2d) 455 (1949), cert. den. 
339 U.S. 984, 70 S.Ct. 1004 (1950), reviewed on writ of habeas corpus in Melanson v. 
O'Brien, (1st Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 963 at 965. See also Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 
108 S.E. 47 (1921), writ of error dismissed 260 U.S. 702, 43 S.Ct. 98 (1922). 
55 Melanson v. O'Brien, (1st Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 963. 
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others. Ordinarily, a public trial entitles the general public and the 
press to free access at all times,56 but occasional sanction has been given 
to temporary barring of doors when the continuous passage of people 
proves to be disruptive of proceedings.57 Particular individuals may 
be ejected if they prove to be disorderly.58 If it becomes necessary to 
clear the courtroom in order to maintain decorum, the judge has power 
to do so. 59 He may also impose restrictions on attendance in the interest 
of public health. 60 Ordinarily the trial must be conducted in a manner 
enabling all present to understand what is taking place,61 but in excep-
tional circumstances, as in instances requiring earphones to hear tran-
scribed or recorded broadcasts, practical considerations will govern. 62 
Out of special regard for the interest of a witness, the courts have 
sometimes felt it necessary to exclude the general public. If a witness 
justifiably fears that circulation of his testimony will subject him to 
physical violence in retaliation, the public may be excluded to assure 
his safety.63 However, if the anticipated testimony is merely personally 
embarrassing to the witness, some courts will not exclude the public, 
at least in cases where the witness is an adult.64 The possible embar-
rassment is considered temporary only, whereas the accused may be 
irreparably injured. Other courts feel that innocent witnesses should 
not be degraded or subjected to humiliation, particularly when the 
56 People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995 (1891). However, witnesses may 
be excluded from the courtroom and kept apart from each other. State v. Worthen, 124 
Iowa 408, 100 N.W. 330 (1904). While jury deliberations are secret, the jury must be 
recalled into open court for further instructions. Arrington v. Robertson, (3d Cir. 1940) 
114 F. (2d) 821. A grand jury indictment must be returned in open court. Zugar v. 
State, 194 Ga. 285, 21 S.E. (2d) 647 (1942). 
57People v. Buck, 46 Cal. App. (2d) 558, 116 P. (2d) 160 (1941) (doors locked 
to obviate disturbance while instructions were being given to the jury). 
58 State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212 (1844). 
59 Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 S. 953 (1901). 
60People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931). 
61 People v. Southack, (Cal. 1952) 241 P. (2d) 558, modified on other grounds, 248 
P. (2d) 12. 
62 D'Aquino v. United States, (9th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 338, cert. den. 343 U.S. 
935, 72 S.Ct. 772 (1952). 
63 Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587 at 598, 104 A. 53 (1918). If the 
presence of a hostile audience creates an atmosphere inimical to accused's right to a fair 
trial, there may be a denial of due process. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 
265 (1923). 
64 Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 S. 504 (1938). Exclusion to prevent embarrass-
ment to an innocent victim requires an assumption that the victim's recital of shame is true 
and the accused's denial or plea of consent is false. Since there is particular danger in 
cases involving sex crimes that an order will exclude persons who may be capable of 
impeaching the one witness testifying against the accused, it has been suggested that 
embarrassment alone does not justify exclusion. Tanksley v. United States, (9th Cir. 
1944) 145 F. (2d) 58, noted 8 UNIV. DETROIT L.J. 129 (1945). 
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accused is the cause of the situation.65 When the humiliation is so 
extreme that the witness cannot testify coherently in the presence of 
an audience, the public may be excluded in order to facilitate the 
testimony. 66 
In cases where the evidence contemplated is of a particularly 
obscene and . immoral nature, the courts are widely split as to the 
advisability of excluding the public, agreeing only that exclusion of 
immature persons from the proceedings is proper. 67 In some states, 
statutes provide that the public may be excluded in such cases, and 
the courts have generally ruled that these statutes do not conflict with 
the state constitutional provisions requiring a public trial. 68 These 
courts minimize the latent dangers accompanying restricted publicity 
of trials and accentuate the benefits thereby inuring to the public. 
The audience, it is argued, is composed for the most part of individuals 
drawn by the lurid and sensational who are not motivated by any 
desire to assure themselves that justice is being done and the courts 
are properly functioning. If the accused desires exclusion of the public 
and the press in such cases because their presence may create an 
atmosphere liostile to his interest, there is no serious objection to 
excluding onlookers temporarily on the ground that testimony is unfit 
to be heard. However, the rights of the accused should not be sub-
ordinated to the motives drawing those in attendance if he believes 
their presence is beneficial. It is doubtful whether the testimony pre-
sented in court will ordinarily have any serious deleterious effect on 
the standards of morality. 
V. Conclusions 
Our courts have operated successfully for nearly two centuries 
under a theory which permits exclusion of the public only when a 
particularly grave reason exists and only so long as that reason exists. 
Any exclusion which is more than temporary in nature renders the 
trial secret so far as the public is concerned. A judge is not defenseless. 
He can maintain order and protect witnesses by temporary exclusion, 
and there is no necessity for permanently excluding the press so long 
65Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914). 
66 State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907). 
67Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 S. 101 (1921). 
68 Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921); contra: People v. Yeager, 113 
Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897). 
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as the judge is armed with the sword of contempt and has the courage 
to use it. It is one thing to place discretion in the hands of the jurist; 
it is another to elevate him to the exalted status of conservator of the 
public morals and censor of the public press. 69 
Carl S. Krueger, S.Ed. 
69 Further references: 49 CoL. L. REv. 110-118 (1949); 35 MICH. L. REv. 474 
(1937); 14 AM. JUR., Criminal Law §§139-143 (1938); 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945); .Alrnorr, 
CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE, 4th ed., Viesselman, §240 (1931); ORPmLD, CRIMINAL 
l'aOCEDURE FROM AruraST TO APPEAL 352, 353, 385-387 (1947). 
